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Abstract—We study deterministic approximations of the Gaus-
sian two-user multiple access wiretap channel (G-MAC-WT) and
the Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper (G-WT-H). These
approximations enable results beyond the recently shown 2/3
and 1/2 secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) for the G-MAC-WT
and the G-WT-H, respectively. While the s.d.o.f. were obtained
by real interference alignment, our approach uses signal-scale
alignment. We show achievable schemes which are independent
of the rationality of the channel gains. Moreover, our results can
differentiate between channel strengths, in particular between
both users, and will establish secrecy rates dependent on this
difference. We can show that the resulting achievable secrecy
rates tend to the s.d.o.f. for vanishing channel gain differences.
Moreover, we extend previous and develop new techniques to
prove generalized s.d.o.f. bounds for varying channel strengths
and show that our achievable schemes reach the bounds for
certain channel gain parameters. We believe that our analysis
is the next step towards a constant-gap analysis of the G-MAC-
WT and the G-WT-H.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel was first proposed by Wyner in [3], and
solved in its degraded version. This result was later extended
to the general wiretap channel by Csiszar and Ko¨rner in [4].
Moreover, the Gaussian equivalent was studied by Leung-Yan-
Cheon and Hellman in [5]. The wiretap channel and its modi-
fied version served as an archetypical channel for physical-
layer security investigations. However, in recent years, the
support of multiple users became increasingly important. A
straightforward extension of the wiretap channel to multiple
users was done in [6], where the Gaussian multiple access
wiretap channel (G-MAC-WT) was introduced. A general
solution for the secure capacity of this multi-user wiretap set-
up was out of reach and investigations focused on the secure
degrees of freedom (s.d.of.) of these networks. Degrees of
freedom are used to gain insights into the scaling behaviour
of multi-user channels in comparison to a single-link scenario.
They measure the capacity of the network, normalized by the
single-link power, as power goes to infinity. This also means
that the d.o.f. provide an asymptotic view on the problem
at hand. This simplifies the analysis and enables asymptotic
solutions of channel models where no finite power capacity
This paper was presented in part at the ISIT 2016 [1], and in the preprint
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results could be found. A disadvantage of the d.o.f. is that they
do not incorporate channel gain differences, as the limiting
process is only on the the signal power itself. This limits the
insights from the d.o.f. about the underlying capacity region,
as those channel gain differences usually play an important
role in multi-user scenarios, for example in the Gaussian
interference channel or the Gaussian multiple access channel.
An example for a technique which yields d.o.f. achievability
results is real interference alignment [7]. It uses integer lattice
transmit constellations which are scaled such that alignment
can be achieved. The intended messages are recovered by
minimum-distance decoding and the minimum distance is
analysed and bounded by usage of the Khintchine-Groshev
theorem of Diophantine approximation theory [7, Appendix
A]. The disadvantage of the method is that these results only
hold for almost all channel gains. This is unsatisfying for
secrecy purposes since it leaves an infinite amount of cases
where the schemes do not work, e.g. rational channel gains.
Moreover, secrecy should not depend on the accuracy of
channel measurements. Real interference alignment is part of a
broader class of interference alignment strategies. Interference
alignment (IA) was introduced in [8] and [9], among others,
and its main idea is to design signals such that the interference
overlaps (aligns) and therefore uses fewer signal dimensions.
The resulting interference-free signal dimensions can be used
for communication. IA methods can be divided into two
categories, namely the vector-space alignment approach and
the signal-scale alignment approach [10]. The former uses
the classical signalling dimensions of time, frequency and
multiple-antennas for the alignment, while the latter uses the
signal strength for alignment. Real interference alignment
and signal-strength deterministic models are examples for
signal-scale alignment. Signal-strength deterministic models
are based on an approximation of the Gaussian channel. An
example for such an approximation is the linear deterministic
model (LDM), introduced by Avestimehr et al. in [11]. It is
based on a binary expansion of the transmit signal, and an
approximation of the channel gain to powers of two. The
resulting binary expansion gets truncated at the noise level
which yields a noise-free binary signal vector and makes
the model deterministic. The next step towards constant-gap
capacity results are the generalized d.o.f., first investigated
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2in [12], which study the limiting process of the signal-to-
noise ratio to infinity. The difference to d.o.f. results is, that
channel gain differences are taken into account. The g.d.o.f.
can therefore add valuable insights about the structure of the
underlying capacity region. The linear deterministic model
yields results which directly correspond to the g.d.o.f. of var-
ious Gaussian channels (i.e. [13], [14], [15], [16]). Moreover,
in those examples the capacity can be approximated by the
LDM such that it is within a constant bit-gap of the Gaussian
channel. This is due to layered lattice coding schemes which
can be used to transfer the achievable scheme to the Gaussian
model. Moreover, converse proofs for the deterministic models
can be often translated to the Gaussian case and are therefore
helpful for constant-gap results.
Previous and related work: Previous work on the wiretap
channel in multi-user settings mainly utilized the real IA ap-
proach in addition to cooperative jamming, introduced in [17].
The idea of using IA in a secrecy context is to cooperatively
jam the eavesdropper, while aligning the jamming signal in a
small subspace at the legitimate receiver. This resulted in a
sum s.d.o.f characterization of K(K−1)K(K−1)+1 for the K-user case
of the G-MAC-WT in [18]. The idea is that the users can allo-
cate a small part of the signalling dimensions with uniformly
distributed random bits. Those random bits are send such that
they occupy a small space at the legitimate receiver, while
overlapping with the signals at the eavesdropper. A specialized
model is the Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper (G-WT-
H). This model consists of the standard wiretap channel model,
with a second independent user, whose only purpose is to
jam the eavesdropper. In [19] and [20], the real IA approach
was used on the G-WT-H (with and without channel state
information, respectively) to investigate the s.d.o.f, therefore
achieve results for the infinite power regime. They showed
that the sum s.d.o.f is 12 for the 2-user case. Another branch
of recent work [21] approached the problem, using a compute-
and-forward decoding strategy, which leads to results for the
finite power regime that are optimal in an s.d.o.f sense. The
next step is to transition from the s.d.o.f. results, to a secure
constant-gap capacity result. A promising approach is to study
linear deterministic approximations to gain insights leading
to constant-gap capacity approximations. This approach has
been used for example for wiretap channels in [22], [23], for
relay networks [24] and for IC channels [25], [26]. It was also
recently used in [27] for an s.d.o.f. analysis of the Gaussian
diamond-wiretap channel, which is a multi-hop version of the
G-MAC-WT.
Contributions: We follow the deterministic approxima-
tion approach and investigate the G-WTH-H and G-MAC-
WT models. For that we assume perfect knowledge of the
magnitude of all channel gains in the network. We show
achievable rate results for the G-WT-H for general channel
gain strengths and a finite SNR regime, independent of the
channel gain being rational or not. Moreover, we develop a
converse proof which shows a constant-gap for certain channel
gain parameter ranges. The upper bound converges to the
s.d.o.f bound for vanishing channel gain differences. These
results were already shown in the conference version of this
publication [1]. The present work extends those results by
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Figure 1. The Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel and the Gaussian
wiretap channel with one helper. The difference between both models is, that
in the former, user 2 wants to send a message (W2), while in the later model,
he only helps user 1 by jamming with J .
providing another more elegant achievability proof and the
full converse proof of the G-WT-H without the assumption
of an uniform input distribution. Both of our results on the
G-WT-H combined give insights into the secure g.d.o.f. (see.
Section II-A) and provide tools and upper bounds for future
constant-gap capacity results. Moreover, we use the same
alignment methods to show an achievable scheme for the linear
deterministic MAC-WT (LD-MAC-WT) which is dependent
on channel gain differences and therefore gives insights into
the secure g.d.o.f. as well. We show that both achievable
schemes can be translated to the Gaussian channel models, by
using layered lattice codes to imitate bit-levels. We extend the
converse proof of [18] for the G-MAC-WT d.o.f towards gen-
eral channel gain strengths, to match our achievable scheme
for certain channel parameter ranges. For that, we combine
previous techniques with new novel techniques to translate
the results of both converse proofs to the Gaussian channel.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel (G-MAC-
WT) and the Gaussian wiretap channel with one helper (G-
WT-H) are defined as a system consisting of 2 transmitters
and 2 receivers, as shown in Fig. 1, where X1, X2 ∈ R
are the channel inputs of both users, communicating with
the legitimate receiver with channel output Y1 or jamming
the eavesdropper, with channel output Y2. The channel itself
is modelled with additive white Gaussian noise, Z1, Z2 ∼
N (0, 1). Therefore, the system equations can be written as
Y1 = h11X1 + h21X2 + Z1, (0a)
Y2 = h22X2 + h12X1 + Z2, (0b)
where the channel inputs satisfy an average transmit power
constraint E{X2i } ≤ Pi for each i. The channel gains from
user i to receiver k are denoted by hik. Let |h11|2P1 = SNR1
and |h21|2P2 = SNR2 represent the received average power
at Y1 of both direct signals. We assume that both signals are
received at Y2 with the same average power and therefore
h12 = h22 = hE and P1 = P2 = P which gives |hE |2P =
SNRE .1 We introduce the two parameters β1 and β2, which
connect the SNR ratios with SNR2 = SNR
β1
1 and SNRE =
1This will reduce the number of cases and therefore simplify the analysis.
However, the following techniques also work without this assumption. See
also remark 3.
3SNRβ21 . The difference between the G-MAC-WT and G-WT-
H is, that in case of the G-WT-H, user 2 is just helping user 1
by independently jamming both receivers to achieve a secure
communication. In the case of the G-MAC-WT model, both
users want to transmit information to Y1 and are able to use
jamming.
1) G-WT-H: A (2nR, n) code will consist of an encoding
and a decoding function. The encoder assigns a codeword
xn1 (w) to each message w, where W is uniformly distributed
over the set [1 : 2nR], and the associated decoder assigns an
estimate wˆ ∈ [1 : 2nR] to each observation of Y n1 . A secure
rate R is said to be achievable if there exist a sequence of
(2nR, n) codes which satisfy a probability of error constraint
P
(n)
e = P(Wˆ 6=W ) ≤  as well as a secrecy constraint
1
nH(W |Y n2 ) ≥ 1nH(W )− , (1)
which gives I(W ;Y n2 ) ≤ n where  → 0 for n → ∞. A
message W is therefore information-theoretically secure if the
eavesdropper cannot reconstruct it from the channel observa-
tion Y n2 . This means that the uncertainty of the message is
almost equal to its entropy, given the channel observation.
2) G-MAC-WT: A (2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) code for the multi-
ple access wiretap channel will consist of a message pair
(W1,W2) uniformly distributed over the message set [1 :
2nR1 ] × [1 : 2nR2 ] with a decoding and two randomized
encoding functions. Encoder 1 assigns a codeword Xn1 (w1)
to each message w1 ∈ [1 : 2nR1 ], while the encoder 2 assigns
a codeword Xn2 (w2) to each message w2 ∈ [1 : 2nR2 ]. The
decoder assigns an estimate (wˆ1, wˆ2) ∈ [1 : 2nR1 ]× [1 : 2nR2 ]
to each observation of Y n1 . A secure rate pair (R1, R2) is said
to be achievable if there exist a sequence of (2nR1 , 2nR2 , n)
codes, which satisfy a reliability constraint, i.e. probability of
error such that: P (n)e = P [(Wˆ1, Wˆ2) 6= (W1,W2)] ≤  and a
security constraint for both messages W1,W2:
1
nH(W1,W2|Y n2 ) ≥ 1nH(W1,W2)− , (2)
which gives I(W1,W2;Y n2 ) ≤ n, where → 0 for n→∞.
In particular, for the G-MAC-WT model, we are interested in
the secure sum-rate RΣ := R1 +R2.
A. Secure Generalized Degrees of Freedom
The following example is from [13, Section 2] and we
encourage the reader to look into that publication for a more
in-depth discussion of degrees-of-freedom. Lets have a look
at the motivating example of the multiple access channel. The
channel model is defined by
Y = h1X1 + h2X2 + Z,
where the channel gains are h1, h2 ∈ C and the input signals
have the power constraint E{|Xi|2} ≤ P . Moreover, the chan-
nel has an additive Gaussian noise Z ∼ CN (0, 1). The model
is parametrized by the signal-to-noise ratios SNR1 := |h1|2P
and SNR2 := |h2|2P . The capacity region of this channel
model is
R1 ≤ log(1 + SNR1) ≈ log SNR1,
R2 ≤ log(1 + SNR2) ≈ log SNR2,
R1 +R2 ≤ log(1 + SNR1 + SNR2) ≈ SNR1,
where we assumed that SNR1 > SNR2. The degrees-of-
freedom are a way to simplify the analysis by looking into
the scaling behaviour of multi-user channels in comparison to
a single-link channel. They are defined as follows
D := lim
P→∞
C(h1, h2, P )
logP
. (3)
The reason behind this formula is that the single link capacity
of the AWGN channel is
C(SNR) = log(1 + SNR) ≈ log SNR, (4)
and the d.o.f therefore provide a scaling of the multi-user
channel in comparison to the single-link capacity, where power
goes to infinity. The d.o.f for the MAC are therefore
d1 ≤ 1, d2 ≤ 1 and d1 + d2 ≤ 1.
One can see that the d.o.f are independent of the channel gains
and do not reflect subtleties in the capacity region. In [12],
a more sophisticated approach, coined generalized d.o.f, was
suggested. There, the ratio between both signal-to-noise ratios
is a fixed constant such that SNRα1 = SNR2. The g.d.o.f. are
then defined as
D(α) := lim
SNR1→∞
C(SNR1,SNRα1 )
log SNR1
.
Notice that the scale difference of both received signals di-
rectly influences the generalized d.o.f. Plugging in the capacity
region of the MAC results in
d1 ≤ 1, d2 ≤ α, and d1 + d2 ≤ 1,
which preserves the subtleties of the finite SNR capacity
region. The g.d.o.f. therefore provide valuable insights on the
behaviour of the capacity region as a function of the channel
gain differences. Now, the secure d.o.f. are defined as in (3),
with the secure capacity instead, which is the supremum of
all achievable secrecy rates. For example, the s.d.o.f. of the
G-WT-H are Ds ≤ 12 . Now, it could be the case that most of
the signal communication between the user and the legitimate
receiver is secure simply because that part vanishes under the
noise floor at the eavesdropper, which is not reflected in the
s.d.o.f. It is therefore important to get insights into the capacity
behaviour in dependence on channel gains with the secure
g.d.o.f. The secure g.d.o.f. for a complex valued channel model
are defined as
Ds(β1, β2) := lim
SNR1→∞
Cs(SNR1,SNR
β1
1 ,SNR
β2
1 )
log SNR1
. (5)
We will look into real valued channels, which changes the
scaling to 12 log SNR1.
B. The Linear Deterministic Approximation
As simplification, we will investigate the corresponding
linear deterministic model (LDM)[11] of the system models
as an intermediate step. For the LDM, inputs are assumed
to have a unit average power constraint, while the channel
gains represent the SNR, such that h =
√
SNR ≈ 2n.
The LDM models the signals of the channel as bit-vectors
X or equivalently as a succession of bits in a scalar x =
40.b1b2b3 . . ., which is achieved by a binary expansion of the
real-valued input signal X . The positions within the bit-vector
are referred to as bit-levels. The channel gain 2n shifts the
bits of a scalar input for n-positions over the decimal point,
such that we have 2nx = b1b2 . . . bn.bn+1bn+2 . . . The noise
only affects the bits on the right hand side of the decimal
point 2nx+z = b1b2 . . . bn.bn+1bn+2 . . . denoted as bn+i. The
deterministic approximation cuts of the noise effected bits after
the shift, which results in y ≈ b1b2 . . . bn. This truncation at
the lowest level (noise level) models the signal impairment of
the Gaussian noise, which yields a deterministic approximation
of the Gaussian model. Viewing this in the equivalent algebraic
notation, channel gains are represented by shifting the input
bit-vector for an appropriate number of bit-levels down. The
shift is introduced by a q× q shift-matrix S, which is defined
as
S =

0 0 · · · 0 0
1 0 · · · 0 0
0 1 · · · 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 · · · 1 0
 . (6)
With S, an incoming bit vector can be shifted for q − n po-
sitions with Y = Sq−nX. Therefore, the channel gain is now
represented by n bit-levels which corresponds to b 12 log SNRc
of the original channel. Furthermore, superposition of different
signals is modelled by binary addition on the bit-levels, i.e.
element-wise addition modulo-two. Carry over is not used to
limit the superposition on the specific level where it occurs.
With these definitions, the model can be written as
Y1 = S
q−n11X′1 ⊕ Sq−n21X′2, (6a)
Y2 = S
q−n22X′2 ⊕ Sq−n12X′1, (6b)
where q := max{n11, n12, n21, n22}. For ease of notation,
we denote X1 = Sq−n11X′1 and X2 = S
q−n21X′2. Further-
more, we denote Sq−n22X′2 and S
q−n12X′1 by X¯2 and X¯1,
respectively. We also include the assumption on the symmetry
in the channel gains at the eavesdropper, which leads to
n22 = n12 =: nE , and denote |n1−n2| =: n∆ with n11 =: n1
and n21 =: n2. We can therefore rewrite the deterministic
channel model as
Y1 = S
q−n1X′1 ⊕ Sq−n2X′2 = X1 ⊕X2, (6c)
Y2 = S
q−nEX′2 ⊕ Sq−nEX′1 = X¯2 ⊕ X¯1. (6d)
The resulting received bit-vectors of the channel model can
be illustrated as shown in Fig. 2. There, one can see that for
example the two bit-vectors X1 and X2 are received at Y1
with n1 and n2 bit-levels, respectively. The highest bit is at
the top of the boxes, while the lowest bit is just above the
noise level. All schemes rely on a partition of the received
signal of the legitimate receiver into a common (Y1,c) and a
private (Y1,p) part. The common bits are the top
nc := min{nE + n∆,max{n1, n2}} (7)
bits of Y1. And the private part consists of the bottom
np := (max{n1, n2} − nc)+ (8)
Y1 Y2
n1
n2
nE∆ Common Part
Private Part
Jamming
Noise Level
Figure 2. The Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper in the linear determin-
istic model. The helper utilizes jamming, such that all used signal parts align
with the jamming at the attacker (Y2).
bits of Y1. We note that due to the bit-level shift, the last
n∆ bits of X1 in Y1,c are actually private, see Remark 2 and
Fig. 2. To specify a particular range of elements in a bit-level
vector we use the notation a[i:j] to indicate that a is restricted
to the bit-levels i to j. Bit-levels are counted from top, most
significant bit in the expansion, to bottom. If i = 1, it will be
omitted a[:j], the same for j=n a[i:]. We define the modulo
operation as a mod n := a− b ancn.
Remark 1. The assumption that n22 = n12 = nE , i.e.
the eavesdropper receives the signals with equal strength,
does not influence the achievable secrecy sum-rate of the LD
system. Consider a channel with n22 6= n12, for example
n22 > n12. The part of X′2 which is received above n12
at the eavesdropper, X¯2,[:n22−n12], cannot be utilized since
it cannot be jammed. One can therefore achieve the same rate
by ignoring the top n22−n12 bits of X′2. The same argument
holds for n12 > n22.
III. MAIN RESULTS
A. Results for the LD-WT-H
We start with the achievable sum-rate of the linear determin-
istic wiretap channel with a helper. We need to differentiate
between the cases n1 ≥ n2 and n1 < n2, since the user and
the helper have different roles and those cases lead to different
schemes. The main idea is to deploy a jamming scheme such
that the jamming signal parts of the helper overlap (align) with
the used signal parts of the user, at Y2, while minimizing the
overlap at the legitimate receiver Y1, see Fig. 2. This leads to
the following result:
Theorem 1. An achievable secrecy rate R of the linear
deterministic wiretap channel with a helper is
R = np +
⌊
nc
2n∆
⌋
n∆ +Q (9)
where
Q =

nQ for nQ < n∆, n1 ≥ n2
n∆ for nQ ≥ n∆, n1 ≥ n2
0 for nQ < n∆, n1 < n2
nQ − n∆ for nQ ≥ n∆, n1 < n2
(10)
with nQ := nc mod 2n∆.
The proof is presented in the analysis section IV-A. This
theorem says, that the secure rate is the sum of the private
5bits np, which are just received by the legitimate receiver, due
to channel gain differences, plus half of the common bits nc
and an additional term Q accounting for the remainder bits of
the partitioning scheme. We now present an upper bound to
the sum-rate.
Theorem 2. The secrecy rate R of the linear deterministic
wiretap channel with one helper and symmetric channel gains
at the wiretapper is bounded from above by
R ≤ min{rub1, rub2, rub3}
with
rub1 = np +
1
2nc +
1
2 (n1 − n2)+
rub2 = n1
rub3 = n2 + (n1 − n2 − nE)+
+ [nE − n2 − (nE − n1 + n2)+]+
The proof was first presented in [1] and is in the same
fashion as for the truncated deterministic model, which is part
of the analysis of the Gaussian model, see Section IV-C for
further details.
B. Results for the LD-MAC-WT
The main idea stays the same: we use a scheme which
aligns the jamming parts with the signal parts at the adversary
receiver, while minimizing the alignment at the legitimate
receiver. But there is the important difference that the channel
is symmetrical, i.e. both users can send messages and jam
which enables a higher achievable rate. We can also assume
w.l.o.g that n1 ≥ n2, due to this symmetry. Our analysis in
section IV-B shows the following:
Theorem 3. An achievable secrecy sum-rate RΣ of the linear
deterministic multiple access wiretap channel with symmetric
channel gains at the eavesdropper is
RΣ = np + b nc3n∆ c2n∆ +Q (11)
and
Q =

q for nQ < n∆
n∆ for 2n∆ > nQ ≥ n∆
n∆ + q for nQ ≥ 2n∆,
(12)
with nQ = nc mod 3n∆ and q = nQ mod n∆.
Notice that, in the LD-WT-H, the common rate part was
approximately nc2 , but now we can achieve
2nc
3 . We therefore
have an increase in the common (secrecy) rate in comparison
to the LD-WT-H. This is due to the aforementioned symmetry.
This observation is in accordance with previous s.d.o.f results,
as they are 12 and
2
3 , for the WT-H and the MAC-WT,
respectively. The next theorem provides the corresponding
upper bound.
Theorem 4. The secrecy sum-rate RΣ of the linear determin-
istic multiple access wiretap channel with symmetric channel
gains at the eavesdropper is bounded from above by
RΣ ≤
{
np +
2
3nc +
1
3n∆ for n2 ≥ nE
2
3nc +
1
3n∆ for nE > n2.
(13)
The proof is in the same fashion as the one for the truncated
deterministic model, see Section IV-C for details.
C. Results for the G-WT-H
To get achievability results for the Gaussian wiretap channel
with a helper, we stick to the previously developed scheme
for the deterministic model. We will transfer the alignment
and jamming structure of the previous model to its Gaussian
equivalent with layered lattice codes, similar to [14]. This
will lead to an achievable rate which is directly based on the
deterministic rate. Moreover, we will make use of results in
[28] to show that the mutual information of the Gaussian case
can be upper bounded by an appropriate deterministic model.
As a result, the bound for the deterministic model is also a
bound for the Gaussian model, with a constant bit-gap.
Theorem 5. An achievable secrecy rate R of the Gaussian
Wiretap channel with a helper is
R = rp + rc + rR
where rc := lu( 12 log SNR
(1−β1)
1 − 12 ), with
lu :=
⌊
min{1 + β2 − β1, 1}
2(1− β1)
⌋
,
rp := 12 log(max{1, SNRβ1−β21 }), and
rR =

rR1 for rR1 < rR2 , SNR1 ≥ SNR2
rR2 for rR1 ≥ rR2 , SNR1 ≥ SNR2
0 for rR1 < rR2 , SNR2 ≥ SNR1
rR3 for rR1 ≥ rR2 , SNR2 ≥ SNR1
with
rR1 := 12 log SNR
1−2lu(1−β1)
1 − 12 log SNRmin{β1−β2,0}1 − 12 ,
rR2 := 12 log SNR
(1−β1)
1 − 12 , rR3 := rR1 − rR2 .
We note that this results directly corresponds to the linear
deterministic result in Theorem 1. For example lu corresponds
to the signal scale factor b nc2n∆ c and log SNR
(1−β1) to n∆,
which can be seen by using (28). We are therefore within
a constant bit-gap of the rates of the deterministic model
(Theorem 1), by comparing via n = b 12 log SNRc. For the
converse, the goal is to bound the Gaussian mutual infor-
mation terms by the ones of the deterministic model. Due
to the G-WT-H consisting of MAC channels with security
constraint, one could try to use the constant-gap bound of
[13]. Unfortunately, the result of [13, Thm.1] for the complex
Gaussian IC, which shows that the capacity is within a
constant-gap of the deterministic IC capacity, depends on the
uniformity of the optimal input distribution in the model to
show that I(W ;Y n2,G) ≤ I(W ;Y n2,LDM) + cn, where G stands
for Gaussian model. However, it was shown in [28] that an
integer-input integer-output model of the MAC-WT and WT-
H, is within a constant-gap of the G-MAC-WT and G-WT-H.
We therefore utilize a variation of that model in section V-B
to transfer the results from Theorem 2 to the Gaussian case,
which results in the following theorem:
6Theorem 6. The secrecy rate R of the Gaussian wiretap
channel with one helper and symmetric channel gains at the
wiretapper is bounded from above by
R ≤ min{rub1, rub2, rub3}+ c
with
rub1 = np +
1
2nc +
1
2 (n1 − n2)+
rub2 = n1
rub3 = n2 + (n1 − n2 − nE)+
+ [nE − n2 − (nE − n1 + n2)+]+,
where c is a constant independent of the signal-to-noise ratio.
We want to point out, that the bound rub3 has two possible
forms for nE > n2 (vanishing private part), depending on the
relation between n1 and n2. For n1 ≤ 2n2, rub3 = n2, while
for n1 > 2n2 the bound becomes rub3 = n1 − n2, which can
be seen in Fig. 3.
D. Results for the G-MAC-WT
For the Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel, we use
the same techniques as in the G-WT-H case. This means we
utilize lattice codes to transfer the achievable scheme from
the linear deterministic model to the Gaussian model, which
results in the following theorem:
Theorem 7. An achievable secrecy sum-rate RΣ of the Gaus-
sian multiple-access wiretap channel is
RΣ = r
p + rc + rR (14)
where rc := lu( 12 log SNR
(1−β1)
1 − 12 ), with
lu := 2
⌊
min{1 + β2 − β1, 1}
3(1− β1)
⌋
, (15)
rp := 12 log(max{1, SNRβ1−β21 }), and
rR =

rR1 for rR1 < rR2
rR2 for 2rR2 > rR1 ≥ rR2
rR1 + rR2 for rR1 ≥ 2rR2 .
(16)
with
rR1 := 12 log SNR
1− 32 lu(1−β1)
1 − 12 log SNRmin{β1−β2,0}1 − 12
rR2 := 12 log SNR
(1−β1)
1 − 12 .
As for the G-WTH-H case, we can see that there is a
direct correspondence between the achievable rate for the
linear deterministic model and the results for the Gaussian
model. In particular, the rate is within a constant bit-gap
of the rates of the deterministic model, by comparing via
n = b 12 log SNRc. Moreover, we transferred the upper bound
of the LD-MAC-WT to the G-MAC-WT, which results in the
following theorem.
Theorem 8. The secrecy sum-rate RΣ of the Gaussian mul-
tiple access wiretap channel with symmetric channel gains at
the eavesdropper is bounded from above by
RΣ ≤
{
np +
2
3nc +
1
3n∆ + c for n2 ≥ nE
2
3nc +
1
3n∆ + c for nE > n2,
(17)
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Figure 3. Illustration of the achievable secrecy rates and upper bounds for
the Gaussian WT-H and the Gaussian MAC-WT in relation to the single-link
scenario, i.e. normalized by log SNR1, and variation in the β1 parameter,
while β2 is fixed at 1, i.e. vanishing private part.
where c is a constant independent of the signal-to-noise ratio.
E. Discussion
Looking into Fig. 3, one can see the achievable rate nor-
malized by the single-link signal-to-noise ratio, with varying
parameter β1 between 0 and 1, i.e. channel gain configurations.
We note, that the theorems also give results for β1 > 1, which
are not shown since they would need separate figures due to
scaling differences, but would basically show a mirrored (at
the right hand side) picture. Moreover, it shows the results
for β2 = 1, which lets the private part vanish. Note that the
private part just provides an off-set to the results above, and we
therefore leave it out of the figure. Fig. 3 therefore provides a
look at the secure g.d.o.f. of both models. One can see that the
secure g.d.o.f converge to the s.d.o.f of 12 for the G-WT-H, and
2
3 for the G-MAC-WT for β1 → 1 and β2 = 1, which agrees
with the results of [19]. We can also see, that the achievable
rate of both models fluctuates between the upper bound and a
lower bound, for the part where the bit-level alignment scheme
is dominant, which is in the range 23 ≤ β1 < 1 and 34 ≤ β1 < 1
for the WT-H and the MAC-WT, respectively. We believe that
this is a result of the orthogonal bit-level alignment techniques
which get transferred to the Gaussian model. A deterministic
model with inter-dependent bit-levels, like the one used in
[10], could help to completely reach the upper bound, therefore
resulting in a constant-gap sum-capacity result for that β1
range. Moreover, as can be seen from the figure, we could
not show a satisfying converse for the MAC-WT in the range
of 0 < β1 ≤ 34 . Comparing with the WT-H model, one would
assume that a similar converse can be shown there. However,
due to the jamming ability of both transmitters, which results
in stochastic encoding functions, those converse techniques
cannot be applied. Finally, we note that our scheme encounters
a singularity at β1 = 1, where no signal-scale diversity can
be used and the alignment scheme fails. A possible solution
could be to also utilize the channel phase, similar to [29].
7IV. ANALYSIS OF THE APPROXIMATIVE MODELS
A. Proof of Theorem 1: Achievable Scheme for the Wiretap
Channel with a Helper
Case n1 ≥ n2 : We denote the part of X1 and X2 in
Y1,c by X1,c and X2,c, respectively. Moreover, we partition
these common parts of the signals into 2n∆-bits partitions. We
now utilize the first n∆ bits of every full partition in X1,c for
messages and leave the remainder free. And for X2,c we utilize
the first n∆-bits of every partition for jamming, while the rest
is free. After partitioning, Y1,c has a remainder part with nQ
bit-levels. The user signal in this remainder part follows the
same rules as before, while the helper lets the first n∆ bits
free and only utilizes the bits afterwards for jamming, until
we have filled all nQ bits. The private part Y1,p can be used
completely by the user, and all of X1 in this part can be used
for messaging. The total achievable rate is the private rate
rp = np plus the common rate
rc =
1
2
(⌊
nc
2n∆
⌋
2n∆
)
+Q, (18)
where Q is defined as in the theorem. The common rate
follows from the fact that we utilize half of the bits of all 2n∆
partitions, along with a remainder part Q. In the remainder we
utilize every bit, as long as nQ is smaller than n∆. If nQ is
larger than n∆, we only utilize the first n∆ bits.
Case n1 < n2: We use the same strategy as before, except
for the remainder part nQ of Y1,c. In the remainder part, the
first n∆ bits of the user are left free, and all bits afterwards
are used for messaging, while the Helper only jams the first
n∆ bits. The strategy is therefore the opposite as before. This
yields a different Q-term, where for nQ < n∆ no rate is
achieved, and for nQ ≥ n∆ one can use nQ − n∆ bits
for messaging. We note that the secrecy is provided by the
(Crypto-) Lemma 1 and the fact that we use binary addition
on each level as well as jamming signals chosen such that
each bit is Bern( 12 ) distributed. And we therefore have that
I(Xn1 ; Z
n) = 0.
Lemma 1 (Crypto-Lemma, [30]). Let G be a compact abelian
group with group operation +, and let Y = X+N , where X
and N are random variables over G and N is independent
of X and uniform over G. Then Y is independent of X and
uniform over G.
Remark 2. The bit-level shift between X1 and X2 of n∆ bits
makes it impossible to divide Y1 in exclusively private and
common parts. In our division, the bottom n∆ bits of x1,c are
only received at Y1 and are, therefore, private. Hence, the
common rate rc is not purely made of common signal parts.
Nevertheless, our choice of division reaches the upper bound
and fits into the scheme.
B. Proof of Theorem 3: Achievable Scheme for the LD-MAC-
WT
For the LD-MAC-WT, due to symmetry, we may assume
w.l.o.g. that n1 > n2, where we leave out the case that
n1 = n2, see remark 3. First of all, we look at the case that
n2 ≥ nE . Our strategy is the same as before, i.e. to deploy
a cooperative jamming scheme such that minimal jamming
is done to Y1,c, while maximal jamming is received at Y2.
We partition the common signals, X1,c and X2,c, into 3n∆-
bit parts and partition these parts again into n∆-bit parts. For
X1,c, in every 3n∆-bit part we use the first n∆ bits for the
message and the next n∆ bits for jamming, while the last n∆
bits will not be used. For X2,c, in every 3n∆-bit part, the first
n∆ bits will be used for jamming. The next n∆ bits will be
used for the message and the last n∆ bits are left free. There
will be a remainder part with
nQ = nc mod 3n∆ bits. (19)
The remainder part follows the same design rules as the 3n∆
parts, except that X2,c leaves the first n∆ bits free, then uses
jamming on the next n∆ bits and utilizes the last n∆ bits
for messaging, until nQ bits are allocated. The scheme is
designed such that the jamming parts of X1,c and X2,c overlap
at Y1,c, while the message parts of one signal overlap with the
non-used part of the other signal. However, due to the signal
strength difference n∆, the jamming parts overlap with the
messages at Y2, see Fig. 4. Secure communication is therefore
provided by the Crypto-lemma, as long as we use a Bern( 12 )
distribution for the jamming bits. The whole private part can
be used for messaging and its sum-rate is therefore rp = np.
The achievable secure rate for the common part consists of
the rate for the 3n∆ partitions and the remainder part. It can
be seen that every 3n∆-part of Y1,c allocates 2n∆ bits for the
messages. This results in the common secrecy rate
rc = (b nc3n∆ c3n∆) 23 +Q, (20)
where Q specifies the rate part of the remainder term. In the
remainder part we allocate all remaining bits as message bits,
as long as nQ < n∆. For 2n∆ > nQ ≥ n∆, we allocate the
first n∆ bits of nQ for the message. And for nQ ≥ 2n∆, we
allocate the first n∆ bits as well as the last q bits, where q is
defined as
q = nQ mod n∆. (21)
This results in
Q =

q for nQ < n∆
n∆ for 2n∆ > nQ ≥ n∆
n∆ + q for nQ ≥ 2n∆.
(22)
Together with the private rate term, we achieve
R = 23 (b nc3n∆ c3n∆) + np +Q.
For n2 ≥ nE the achievable scheme is the same, except that
we do not have a private part. We therefore have an achievable
rate of
R = 23 (b nc3n∆ c3n∆) +Q,
which completes the proof.
C. Proof of Theorem 2 and 4: Upper Bounds for the LD-WT-H
and the LD-MAC-WT
The converse proofs for the Gaussian models are developed
such that we can use the upper bounds of the rates for
the linear deterministic models. We therefore leave out those
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nQ
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X1
X2
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nc
np
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Figure 4. Illustration of the achievable scheme for the LD-MAC-WT. The
private part Y1,p can be used freely and is allocated by User 1. The common
part Y1,c uses our alignment strategy. The strategy exploits the channel gain
difference between both signals, to minimize the effect of jamming at the
receiver Y1, while jamming all signal parts at the eavesdropper Y2.
proofs for the deterministic models due to space limitations.
One can reconstruct the proofs by substituting the terms of
the truncated deterministic model with the linear deterministic
ones. The following table gives the correspondence between
the terms:
Truncated Model LD Model
Y1,D, Y2,D Y1,Y2
bh1X1,Dc X1
bh2X2,Dc X2
bhEX2,Dc X¯2
bhEX1,Dc X¯1
We note that the indexing via levels, i.e. such as (X¯1)[:n2] is
the same for both models.
Remark 3. Our schemes rely on the signal strength difference
between both users. Our scheme would not work, if n1 = n2,
while having equal channel gains at the eavesdropper. In that
case we would not have any signal strength diversity to exploit
which results in a singularity point where the secrecy rate is
zero.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CHANNEL WITH
A HELPER
A. Proof of Theorem 5: Achievable Rate for the G-WT-H
The following procedure is inspired by the achievability
proof in [14]. We will look into the case that SNR1 ≥ SNR2,
the other case follows similarly. For the achievable scheme,
we need to partition the received signal-to-noise ratios at Y1
into intervals of SNR(1−β1)1 . Each of these intervals plays the
role of an n∆−Interval of bit-levels in the linear deterministic
scheme and has a power-to-noise ratio θl, which is defined as
θl = ql−1 − ql = SNR1−(l−1)(1−β1)1 − SNR1−l(1−β1)1 (23)
with l indicating the specific level. The users decompose
the signals Xi into a sum of independent sub-signals Xi =
∑lmax
l=1 Xil. We will use n-dimensional nested lattice codes,
introduced in [31], which can achieve capacity in the AWGN
single-user channel.
1) Nested Lattice Codes: A lattice Λ is a discrete subgroup
of Rn which is closed under real addition and reflection. More-
over, denote the nearest neighbour quantizer by QΛ(x) :=
arg mint∈Λ ||x−t||. The fundamental Voronoi region V(Λ) of
a lattice Λ consists of all points which get mapped or quantized
to the zero vector and the modulo operation for lattices is
defined as [x] mod Λ := x−QΛ(x).
A nested lattice code is composed of a pair of lattices
(Λfine,Λcoarse), where V(Λcoarse) is the fundamental Voronoi
region of the coarse lattice and operates as a shaping region
for the corresponding fine lattice Λfine. It is therefore required
that Λcoarse ⊂ Λfine. Such a code has a corresponding rate
R equal to the logarithm of the nesting ratio. A part of the
split message is now mapped to the corresponding codeword
ui(l) ∈ Λfine,l−1 ∩ V(Λcoarse,l), which is a point of the fine
lattice inside the fundamental Voronoi region of the coarse
lattice. Note that Λlmax ⊂ · · · ⊂ Λ1. The code is chosen
such that it has a power of θl. The codeword xi(l) is now
given as xi(l) = [ui − di] mod Λl, where we dither (shift)
with di ∼ Unif(V(Λl)) and reduce the result modulo-Λl.
Transmitter i now sends a scaled xi over the channel, such
that the power per sub-signal xi(l) is θl|hi1|2 and receivers see
a power of θl. Due to the partitioning construction, the xi
satisfy the power restriction of P for user 1,
lmax∑
l=1
θl
|h11|2 ≤
SNR1
|h11|2 = P (24)
and user 2
lmax∑
l=2
θl
|h21|2 ≤
SNR2
|h21|2 = P. (25)
Moreover, aligning sub-signals use the same code (with
independent shifts). In [31] it was shown that nested lattice
codes can achieve the capacity of the AWGN single-user
channel with vanishing error probability. Viewing each of our
power intervals as a channel, we therefore have that
R(l) ≤ 12 log
(
1 +
θl
N(l)
)
, (26)
where N(l) denotes the noise variance per dimension of the
sub-sequent levels. Now, X1 is used for signal transmission,
while X2 is solely used for jamming. As in the deterministic
case, the objective is to align the signal parts of X1 with
the jamming of X2 at Y2, while allowing decoding of the
signal parts at Y1. Due to the signal scale based coding
strategy and the equal received signal-to-noise ratios at Y2,
an alignment is achieved with the proposed scheme. We
use a jamming strategy, where the jamming sub-codeword is
uniformly distributed on V , therefore x2,jam(l) ∼ Unif(V(Λl)).
Now, application of lemma 1 shows, that the received code-
word y = [x1(l) + x2,jam(l)] mod Λl is independent of x1(l),
therefore providing secrecy. The only thing left to prove is
that the signal can be decoded at Y1. The decoding is done
level-wise, treating subsequent levels as noise. Every level is
treated as a Gaussian point-to-point channel with power θl and
9noise 1 + SNR1−l(1−β1)1 , which consists of the base noise N1
at Y1 and the power of all subsequent levels of both signals.
Successful decoding can be assured with a rate limitation (see
(26)) of
rl ≤ 12 log
(
1 +
θl
1 + SNR1−l(1−β1)1
)
. (27)
2) Achievable rate: As in the deterministic case, we have
a private and common part and are defined equivalently. The
common part depends on the strength of the received power
at the eavesdropper (nc := min{nE + n∆, n1} for n1 ≥ n2).
Note that there is the correspondence
β1 =
log SNR2
log SNR1
≈ n2
n1
(28)
and also β2 ≈ nEn1 . Therefore, the part nE+n∆ corresponds to
SNRβ2+(1−β1)1 in the Gaussian model. The opposing remain-
der is therefore SNRβ1−β21 and we get the common power-to-
noise ratio as
SNRc := SNR1 −max{1,SNRβ1−β21 }, (29)
while the private part has a power-to-noise ratio of
SNRp := max{1,SNRβ1−β21 } − 1. (30)
The private part will not be partitioned further, since it can be
used completely and without penalty. Moreover, it has only
the base noise and a rate of rp = 12 log(1 + SNRp) can
be achieved. For the common part, we use the deterministic
achievable scheme and need to partition the available power-
to-noise ratio. All odd levels l of X1 will be used for signal
transmission. Every level l can handle a rate of rl. We can
simplify the rate of (27) with
log
(
1 +
a− b
1 + b
)
= log
(
a+ 1
1 + b
)
≥ log
( a
2b
)
where we used that b > 1 to get rl ≥ 12 log SNR(1−β1)1 − 12 ,
where the 1−l(1−β1)-terms get cancelled in the last fraction.
Since we use the same scheme as in the deterministic case,
we have a total of
lu :=
⌊
min{1 + β2 − β1, 1}
2(1− β1)
⌋
(31)
used levels in X1, where the remainder term is not yet
included. The alignment section of the common part has a
total rate of
rc = lu(
1
2 log SNR
(1−β1)
1 − 12 ), (32)
which corresponds to b nc2n∆ cn∆ in the deterministic case.
Moreover, we need to consider the remainder term, which is
allocated between the alignment structure and the noise floor
or the private part. Once again we use the deterministic scheme
as a basis. We see in (10), that we have two cases for n1 ≥ n2,
which corresponds to SNR1 ≥ SNR2. If the remainder has a
power-to-noise ratio of
SNRr = SNR
1−2lu(1−β1)
1 − SNRmin{β1−β2,0}1
< SNR1−2lu(1−β1)1 − SNR1−(2lu+1)(1−β1)1 ,
it achieves a rate of
rR ≥ 12 log SNR1−2lu(1−β1)1 − 12 log SNRmin{β1−β2,0}1 − 12 .
Otherwise, it can only use a full partition, which leads to
rR ≥ 12 log SNR(1−β1)1 − 12 .
We therefore get a total rate of rach = rp + rc + rR. The
case for SNR2 > SNR1 can be shown similarly.
B. Proof of Theorem 6: Developing a Converse from LD-
Bounds
Ideally, we want to re-use the insights (and results) from the
deterministic model to derive an upper bound for the Gaussian
channel. However, there is no direct constant-gap relation for
the relevant models between the Gaussian channel version and
the linear deterministic model. It was shown in [28] that the
integer-input integer-output model of the MAC-WT, is within
a constant-gap of the G-MAC-WT. This result can also be used
for the G-WT-H. The system equations for the integer-input
integer-output model can be written as
Y¯1,D = bh11X¯1,Dc+ bh21X¯2,Dc (32a)
Y¯2,D = bh22X¯2,Dc+ bh12X¯1,Dc, (32b)
where the X¯D1 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , b
√
SNRc}. One can construct
these codewords easily from a set of given codewords for
the Gaussian case by bXGc mod b
√
P c. It was shown in
[28], that the mutual information terms for the integer-input
integer-output channel (33) are within a constant-gap2 of the
corresponding Gaussian model (1), which means that
I(W1,W2; Y¯
n
1,D) ≤ I(W1,W2;Y n1,G) + nc (32c)
I(W1,W2;Y
n
2,G) ≤ I(W1,W2; Y¯ n2,D) + nc, (32d)
where c is a constant. The first inequality follows from a proof
in [13] and a more detailed version of the same ideas in [32].
The second inequality builds on lemmata and ideas from [13],
[32] and [11]. We therefore have that
n(R1 +R2) = I(W1,W2;Y
n
1,G)− I(W1,W2;Y n2,G) + n
≤ I(W1,W2; Y¯ n1,D)− I(W1,W2; Y¯ n2,D) (33)
+n(c+ ),
which shows that any bound for the integer-input integer-
output model can be used as an outer bound for the corre-
sponding Gaussian model. Now, to bring the LDM ideas to
the truncated model, we modify the form such that X¯D1 is
represented3 as
X1,D = 2
n
n∑
b=1
X˜1,b2
−b ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1}, (34)
where n = blogb√SNRcc and X˜1,b ∈ F2. Note that the
floor function around the logarithm, i.e. the quantization from
2It was actually stated that both terms are within o(logP ). However, the
result also satisfies the stronger notion of a constant-gap.
3For the time being, we use n as the index of the bit-level as well as the
sequence index. This will be distinguishable later on, since the bit-level index
will always have a subscript indicating the specific channel gain.
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integers to powers of two, reduces the cardinality of the input
constellation by at most half plus one-half, which results in
a maximum bit-gap of 2 bits in the capacity results for high-
SNR. We can therefore work with the model
Y1,D = bh11X1,Dc+ bh21X2,Dc (34a)
Y2,D = bh22X2,Dc+ bh12X1,Dc, (34b)
where hijXi,D = hij2nij
∑nij
b=1 X˜i,b2
−b, hij ∈ [1, 2) and the
nij correspond to the bit-levels in the LD model. We now
include the simplifying notation changes from the determinis-
tic model and the assumption on equal received power at the
wiretaper and write the model as
Y1,D = bh1X1,Dc+ bh2X2,Dc (34c)
Y2,D = bhEX2,Dc+ bhEX1,Dc. (34d)
We will call this model the truncated deterministic model
(TDM). For the converse proofs we will also need the fol-
lowing lemmata. Note that the following lemmata results and
ideas were already used for example in the converse proof
in [33] but without rigorous justification. Moreover, the first
lemma uses ideas from a proof in [13].
Lemma 2. For an arbitrary signal XD ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1},
with n ∈ N and channel gain h ∈ [1, 2) we have that
H(bhXDc) = H(X˜1, . . . , X˜n),
where X˜i ∈ F2 are such that XD = 2n
∑n
i=1 X˜i2
−i.
Proof. We denote the tuple (X˜1, . . . , X˜n) ∈ Fn2 by X˜. There
is a bijection f1 : Fn2 → {0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1} which can be
constructed as f1(X˜) = 2n
∑n
i=1 X˜i2
−i. Now, the resulting
integers are distance one apart. Therefore multiplying by
h ∈ [1, 2) does not lower the distance. Quantizing those
scaled values to the integer part only introduces gaps in the
support, but does not reduce the cardinality. We therefore have
that f2(XD) = bhXDc is again a bijection. Therefore, the
composition of both functions f3 = f2 ◦ f1 is a bijection and
we have that
H(f3(X˜)) = H(X˜)
which shows the result.
Lemma 3. For an arbitrary signal XD ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1},
with n,m ∈ N, m < n, XD = 2n
∑n
i=1 X˜i2
−i, X˜ ∈ F2 and
channel gain h ∈ [1, 2) we have that
H(bh2n
n∑
i=1
X˜i2
−ic)
= H(bh2n
m∑
i=1
X˜i2
−ic+ bh2n
n∑
i=m+1
X˜i2
−ic)
Proof. The first entropy term contains 2n
∑n
i=1 X˜i2
−i ∈
{0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1}. As argued previously, the support has
distance one, and multiplying by the channel gain and taking
the integer part only introduces gaps in the support and scales
the values up, but the cardinality stays the same. Therefore,
| supp(XD)| = | supp(bhXDc)| = 2n. Now, the same is true
for
XD := 2
n
n∑
i=m+1
X˜i2
−i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2n−m−1}.
It also holds for
X¯D := 2
n
m∑
i=1
X˜i2
−i
∈ {0, 2n−m, 2n−m+1, 2n−m + 2n−m+1, . . . , 2n−2n−m},
where the distance is 2n−m > 1, since n > m. Moreover, we
have that XD = X¯D +XD. The cardinality of the support of
X¯D is
supp(X¯D) =
2n − 2n−m
2n−m
+ 1 = 2m.
Now, due to the structure4, the sum between XD and X¯D
yields a Cartesian product between the support sets, and we
therefore have that
| supp(XD + X¯D)| = 2n = 2n−m2m
= | supp(XD)|| supp(X¯D)|,
for the support of the sum-set. The same holds for the scaled
integer parts, since they have the same scaling and therefore
| supp(bh(XD + X¯D)c)| = | supp(XD + X¯D)|
= | supp(XD)|| supp(X¯D)|
= | supp(bhXDc)|| supp(bhX¯Dc)|
= | supp(bhXDc+ bhX¯Dc)|,
which proves the result.
Moreover, we introduce the function
f[a:b](bhXDc) = (bhXDc)[a:b] = bhij2nij
b∑
k=a
X˜k2
−kc,
which restricts the exponents of the binary expansion inside
the term to lie in the set of integers {a, a + 1, . . . , b}. The
result of Lemma 3 can then be written as
H(bhXDc) = H((bhXDc)[1:m] + (bhXDc)[m+1:n]).
If the term is a sum of two signals, then both get restricted
relative to the stronger part. Therefore, a signal
YD = bh12n
n∑
i=1
X˜1,i2
−ic+ bh22m
m∑
i=1
X˜2,i2
−ic, (35)
where n > m, can be restricted to
(YD)[1:a] = bh12n
a∑
i=1
X˜1,i2
−ic+ bh22m
a−(n−m)∑
i=1
X˜2,i2
−ic.
Moreover, we use the notation also on the bit-tuples to indicate
that (X˜1, . . . , X˜n) ∈ Fn2 by X˜ is restricted to the bits a to b,
such that (X˜a, . . . , X˜b) is denoted as (X˜)[a:b]. The notation
is therefore the same as for the bit-vectors in the linear
4In particular because the biggest element of XD is still smaller than the
smallest distance in X¯D .
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deterministic model. We start with the G-WT-H version of
equation (33) and convert the steps of the proof for the linear
deterministic case to the truncated deterministic model.
n(R− ) = I(W ;Y n1,G)− I(W ;Y n2,G)
≤ I(W ;Y n1,D)− I(W ;Y n2,D) + nc
≤ I(W ;Y n1,D)− I(W ; (Y2,D)n[1:n2]) + nc
= H(Y n1,D)−H(Y n1,D|W )−H((Y n2,D)[:n2])
+H((Y n2,D)[:n2]|W ) + nc
= H(Y n1,D)−H((Y n2,D),[:n2]) +H((bhEXn2,Dc)[:n2])
−H(bh2Xn2,Dc) + nc,
where Fanos inequality and the secrecy constraint was used.
Moreover, we used the fact that I(W ;Y n2,D) ≥ I(W ; f(Y n2,D))
for arbitrary functions f , due to the data processing inequality.
Note that for n2 ≥ nE , we have that (Y n2,D)[:n2] = Y n2,D. In the
last line we used that X1,D is a function of W , and X2,D is
independent of W , due to the Helper model assumptions. We
remark that the first property does not hold in general, since
jamming through the first user would result in a stochastic
function. Now, for nE ≥ n2, both terms bh2Xn2,Dc and
(bhEXn2,Dc)[:n2] have the same bits, and we can use lemma 2
to show that
H((bhEXn2,Dc)[:n2])−H(bh2Xn2,Dc) = 0
and for nE < n2 the second term contains more bits, and we
can therefore use the chain rule and lemma 2 and show that
H((bhEXn2,Dc)[:n2])−H(bh2Xn2,Dc)
= −H((X˜n2 )[nE+1:]|(X˜n2 )[:nE ]). (36)
We now split the received signals in common and private parts.
We start by adding two of the terms and split them apart
2(H(Y n1,D)−H((Y n2,D)[:n2]))
≤ 2H((Y n1,D)[nc+1:]) + 2H((Y n1,D)[:nc])− 2H((Y n2,D)[:n2]).
Note that the private part H((Y n1,D)[nc+1:]) is zero for n1 ≤
nE . Now, counting from top to bottom, for n1 ≥ n2,
Xn1,D has nc bit-levels in (Y1,D)[:nc], while X
n
2,D has η :=
min{nE ,min{n1, n2}} = nc − n∆ bit-levels. Therefore, η
represents the amount of bit-levels of the weaker signal in
the common received signal part. Hence, for n2 > n1, Xn1,D
and Xn2,D have η and nc bit-levels in that term, respectively.
We need to account for this switch of indexing in the next
part, where we analyse the entropy difference. We will use a
method inspired by [34] to show the following (for n1 ≥ n2)
2(H(Y n1,D)−H((Y n2,D)[:n2])
≤ 2H((Y n1,D)[nc+1:]) + 2H((Y n1,D)[:nc])
−H((Y n2,D)[:n2]|X˜n1 )−H((Y n2,D)[:n2]|X˜n2 )
= 2H((Y n1,D)[nc+1:]) + 2H((Y
n
1,D)[:nc])
−H((X˜n2 )[:n2])−H((X˜n1 )[:n2])
= 2H((Y n1,D)[nc+1:]) +H((Y
n
1,D)[:nc])−H((X˜n2 )[:n2])
+H((f(bh1Xn1,Dc, bh2Xn2,Dc))[:nc])−H((X˜n1 )[:n2])
≤ 2H((Y n1,D)[nc+1:]) +H((Y n1,D)[:nc])−H((X˜n2 )[:n2])
+H((bh2Xn2,Dc)[:η]) +H((bh1Xn1,Dc)[:nc])−H((X˜n1 )[:n2])
= 2H((Y n1,D)[nc+1:]) +H((Y
n
1,D)[:nc])−H((X˜n2 )[:n2])
+H((X˜n2 )[:η]) +H((X˜
n
1 )[:nc])−H((X˜n1 )[:n2]),
We now have for n1 ≥ n2 that
H((X˜n1 )[:nc])−H((X˜n1 )[:n2]) ≤ n(nc−min{n2, nE})+ ≤ nn∆,
and
H((X˜n2 )[:η])−H((X˜n2 )[:n2]) ≤ n(η −min{n2, nE})+ = 0.
And for n2 > n1 we get
H((X˜n1 )[:η])−H((X˜n1 )[:n2]) ≤ n(η −min{n2, nE})+ = 0,
and
H((X˜n2 )[:nc])−H((X˜n2 )[:n2]) ≤ n(nc −min{n2, nE})+.
We remark that the last term gets (n2−nE)+ for n1 < nE <
n2, in which case we can use (36), which has a length of
(n2 − nE) bit-levels. Also for nE < n1 < n2 we have that
n(nc −min{n2, nE})+ = nn∆, by using (36) again, we see
that for n2 > n1
H((X˜n2 )[:nc])−H((X˜n2 )[:n2]) ≤ n(nc −min{n2, nE})+ = 0.
We therefore have an additional term of nn∆ for n1 ≥ n2.
Now one can divide all terms by two, resulting in
H(Y n1,D)−H((Y n2,D)[:n2])
≤ H((Y n1,D)[nc+1:]) +
1
2
H((Y n1,D)[:nc]) +
n
2
(n1 − n2)+.
Plugging all the results into the first equation yields
n(R− ) ≤ n(np + 12nc + 12 (n1 − n2)+ + c).
dividing by n and letting n→∞ shows the result.
For the case that n2 > 2n1 we have that
n(R− ) ≤ H(Y n1,D)−H(Y n2,D) +H(bhEXn2,Dc)
−H(bh2Xn2,Dc) + nc
≤ H(bh1Xn1,Dc) +H(bh2Xn2,Dc)−H(Y n2,D|X˜n1 )
−H(bh2Xn2,Dc) +H(bhEXn2,Dc) + nc
= H(bh1Xn1,Dc) ≤ nn1
and for the case that 3n2 < 2n1 we have that
nR ≤ I(W ;Y n1,D)− I(W ;Y n2,D) + n(+ c)
≤ I(W ;Y n1,D)− I(W ; (Y n2,D)[:n1−n2]) + n(+ c)
≤ H(Y n1,D)−H((Y n2,D)[:n1−n2])
+H((bhEXn2,Dc)[:n1−n2])−H(bh2Xn2,Dc) + n(+ c)
≤ H((Y n1,D)[:(n1−n2)])−H((Y n2,D)[:n1−n2]|X˜n2 )
+H((Y n1,D)[(n1−n2)+1:]|(Y n1,D)[:(n1−n2)])
+H((bhEXn2,Dc)[:n1−n2])−H(bh2Xn2,Dc) + n(+ c).
One can show that
H((Y n1,D)[:(n1−n2)])−H((Y n2,D)[:n1−n2]|X˜n2 )
≤ n(n1 − n2 − nE)+
12
and
H((bhEXn2,Dc)[:n1−n2])−H(bh2Xn2,Dc)
≤ n(min{n1 − n2, nE} − n2)
= n[nE − n2 − (nE − n1 + n2)+]+
and H((Y n1,D)[(n1−n2)+1:]|(Y n1,D)[:(n1−n2)]) ≤ nn2 which
yields
nR ≤ nn2 + n(n1 − n2 − nE)+
+ n[nE − n2 − (nE − n1 + n2)+]+ + n(+ c)
dividing by n and letting n→∞ shows the result.
VI. THE GAUSSIAN MULTIPLE-ACCESS WIRETAP
CHANNEL
In this section we analyse the Gaussian MAC-WT channel.
As in the case for the WT channel with a Helper, we want
to stick to the ideas of the corresponding linear deterministic
model. This means we want to transfer the alignment and
jamming structure to its Gaussian equivalent with layered
lattice codes. This will lead to an achievable rate which
is directly based on the deterministic rate. Moreover, we
will make use of the previously developed ideas to convert
the converse proof of the linear deterministic model, to the
truncated model and therefore to the Gaussian model.
A. Proof of Theorem 7: Achievable Sum-Rate for the G-MAC-
WT
We use the same framework as for the wiretap channel with
a helper in section V-A. We partition the signal-to-noise ratio
into intervals with power θl, see eq. (23), where l indicates the
level. Each of these intervals plays the role of an n∆−Interval
of bit-levels in the linear deterministic scheme. We therefore
partition the received power-to-noise ratio at Y1 into intervals
SNR(1−β1)1 . The users decompose the signals Xi into a sum
of independent sub-signals Xi =
∑lmax
l=1 Xil. And each signal
uses the layered lattice codes as defined in section V-A. Note
that, w.l.o.g we look at the case SNR1 > SNR2, which is
β1 < 1. Due to the symmetry of the users the case β1 ≥ 1
follows immediately by interchanging both signals. As in the
deterministic case, we have a private and common part. The
common part is defined as the bit-levels nc := min{nE +
n∆, n1}. The part nE + n∆ corresponds to SNRβ2+(1−β1)1
in the Gaussian model. The opposing remainder is therefore
SNRβ1−β21 and we get the common power-to-noise ratio as
SNRc := SNR1 −max{1,SNRβ1−β21 }, (37)
while the private part has a power-to-noise ratio of
SNRp := max{1,SNRβ1−β21 } − 1, (38)
exactly as in the case of the wiretap channel with a helper.
However, due to the modified scheme where both users jam
and align their jamming signals at the legitimate receiver (see
section IV-B) we have a different number of used levels for
messaging. We have
lu := 2
⌊
min{1 + β2 − β1, 1}
3(1− β1)
⌋
(39)
used levels for messaging, where each one supports a rate of
rl ≥ 12 log SNR(1−β1)1 − 12 . And we therefore have a sum rate
of
rc = lu(
1
2 log SNR
(1−β1)
1 − 12 ), (40)
for the whole common alignment part. Moreover, we need to
consider the remainder term, which is allocated between the
alignment structure and the noise floor or the private part. We
see from the deterministic scheme that for 1− ( 32 lu + 1)(1−
β1) < min{β1 − β2, 0} we can achieve a rate of
rR ≥ 12 log SNR
1− 32 lu(1−β1)
1 − 12 log SNRmin{β1−β2,0}1 − 12 .
Moreover, for 1 − ( 32 lu + 2)(1 − β1) < min{β1 − β2, 0} ≤
1− ( 32 lu + 1)(1− β1) we have
rR ≥ 12 log SNR(1−β1)1 − 12 ,
and for min{β1 − β2, 0} ≤ 1− ( 32 lu + 2)(1− β1) we have
rR ≥ 12 log SNR(1−β1)1 + 12 log SNR
1− 32 lu(1−β1)
1
− 12 log SNRmin{β1−β2,0}1 − 1.
We therefore get a total rate of RΣ = rp + rc + rR. The case
for SNR2 > SNR1 can be shown similarly.
B. Proof of Theorem 8: Sum-Rate Bound for the G-MAC-WT
We use a similar approach as for the Gaussian WT with a
helper, with the same framework developed in section V-B.
This means we also use the truncated deterministic model
Y1,D = bh1X1,Dc+ bh2X2,Dc (40a)
Y2,D = bhEX2,Dc+ bhEX1,Dc, (40b)
which can be shown to be within a constant gap to the
Gaussian channel, see (33).
Proof. We begin with the following derivations
n(RΣ − ) (41)
= I(W1,W2;Y
n
1,G)− I(W1,W2;Y n2,G)
≤ I(W1,W2;Y n1,D)− I(W1,W2;Y n2,D) + nc
≤ I(W1,W2;Y n1,D, Y n2,D)− I(W1,W2;Y n2,D) + nc
≤ I(W1,W2;Y1,D|Y2,D) + nc
≤ I(Xn1,D, Xn2,D;Y n1,D|Y n2,D) + nc
= H(Y n1,D|Y n2,D)−H(Y n1,D|Y n2,D, Xn1,D, Xn2,D) + nc
(b)
= H(Y n1,D|Y n2,D) + nc
(c)
≤ H(Y n1,D,c|Y2,D) +H(Y n1,D,p|Y2,D, Y1,D,c) + nc (42)
where we used basic techniques such as Fano’s inequality
and the chain rule. Step (a) introduces the secrecy constraint
(1), while we used the chain rule, non-negativity of mutual
information and the data processing inequality in the fol-
lowing lines. Step (b) follows from the fact that Y n1,D is a
function of (Xn1,D, X
n
2,D). Note that due to the definition of
the common and the private part5 of Y n1,D, it follows that
5The common part is defined as Y n1,D,c = (Y
n
1,D)[:nc], and the private part
as Y n1,D,p = (Y
n
1,D)[nc+1:].
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H(Y n1,D,p|Y2,D, Y1,D,c) = 0 for nE ≥ n2. For step (c), we
used lemma 3, the data-processing inequality and the chain-
rule. We now extend the strategy of [18], of bounding a single
signal part, to asymmetrical channel gains
n(R1 − 3) (43)
≤ I(Xn1,D;Y n1,D)
≤ I(Xn1,D;Y n1,D,c) + I(Xn1,D;Y n1,D,p|Y n1,D,c)
= H(Y n1,D,c)−H(Y n1,D,c|Xn1,D) + I(Xn1,D;Y n1,D,p|Y n1,D,c)
= H(Y n1,D,c)−H((bh2Xn2,Dc)[:nc]) + I(Xn1,D;Y n1,D,p|Y n1,D,c)
and it therefore holds that
H((bh2Xn2,Dc)[:nc]) ≤ H(Y n1,D,c) (44)
+I(Xn1,D;Y
n
1,D,p|Y n1,D,c)− n(R1 − 3).
The same can be shown for H((bh2Xn1,Dc)[:nc]), where it holds
that
H((bh2Xn1,Dc)[:nc]) ≤ H(Y n1,D,c) (45)
+I(Xn2,D;Y
n
1,D,p|Y n1,D,c)− n(R2 − 3).
Moreover, we have that
I(Xn1,D;Y
n
1,D,p|Y n1,D,c) + I(Xn2,D;Y n1,D,p|Y n1,D,c)
= 2H(Y n1,D,p|Y n1,D,c)−H(Y n1,D,p|Y n1,D,c, Xn1,D)
−H(Y n1,D,p|Y n1,D,c, Xn2,D)
= 2H(Y n1,D,p|Y n1,D,c)− H((bh2Xn2,Dc)[nc+1:]|Y n1,D,c)
−H((bh1Xn1,Dc)[nc+1:]|Y n1,D,c)
= H(Y n1,D,p|Y n1,D,c). (46)
The key idea for the various cases is now to bound the term
H(Y n1,D,c|Y2,D), or equivalently H(Y n1,D|Y2,D) for nE > n2, in
an appropriate way, to be able to use (45) and (46) on (42).
We start with the first case:
1) Case n2 ≥ nE: Here we have a none vanishing
private part, due to the definition of Y n1,D,c and therefore
need to bound the term H(Y n1,D,c|Y2,D). Note that due to
the definition of Y n1,D,c and the specific case, we have that
H((bh2Xn2,Dc)[:nc]) = H(bhEXn2,Dc). We look into the first
term of equation (42) and show that
H(Y n1,D,c|Y2,D)
= H(Y n1,D,c, Y2,D)−H(Y2,D)
≤ H(Y n1,D,c, bhEX2,Dc, bhEX1,Dc)−H(Y2,D)
= H(bhEX2,Dc, bhEX1,Dc)−H(Y2,D)
+H(Y n1,D,c|bhEX2,Dc, bhEX1,Dc)
≤ H(bhEX1,Dc) +H(bhEX2,Dc)−H(Y2,D|X2,D)
+H(Y n1,D,c|bhEX2,Dc, bhEX1,Dc)
= H(bhEX2,Dc) +H(Y n1,D,c|bhEX2,Dc, bhEX1,Dc).(47)
Observe that the second term of equation (47) is dependent
on the specific regime. We can bound this term by
H(Y n1,D,c|bhEX2,Dc, bhEX1,Dc) ≤ n(nc−nE) = nn∆. (48)
Note that the choice of bhEX2,Dc in (47) as remaining signal
part was arbitrary due to our assumption that both signals
bhEX1,Dc and bhEX2,Dc have the same signal strength.
Moreover, it follows on the same lines that
H(Y n1,D,c|Y2,D) ≤ H(bhEX1,Dc) + nn∆. (49)
Looking at this result, its intuitive that one can also show the
stronger result
H(Y n1,D,c|Y2,D) ≤ H((bh1X1,Dc)[:nc]) (50)
for the case that n2 ≥ nE . This can be shown by considering
a similar strategy as in (47)
H(Y n1,D,c|Y2,D)
= H(Y n1,D,c, Y2,D)−H(Y2,D)
≤ H(Y2,D, (bh1X1,Dc)[:nc], (bh2X2,Dc)[:nE ])−H(Y2,D)
= H((bh1X1,Dc)[:nc], (bh2X2,Dc)[:nE ])−H(Y2,D)
+H(Y2,D|(bh1X1,Dc)[:nc], (bh2X2,Dc)[:nE ])
≤ H((bh1X1,Dc)[:nc]) +H((bh2X2,Dc)[:nE ])
−H(Y2,D|X1,D)
+H(Y2,D|(bh1X1,Dc)[:nc], (bh2X2,Dc)[:nE ]))
= H((bh1X1,Dc)[:nc])
+H(Y2,D|(bh1X1,Dc)[:nc], (bh2X2,Dc)[:nE ])), (51)
where
H(Y2,D|(bh1X1,Dc)[:nc], (bh2X2,Dc)[:nE ])) (52)
≤ n(nE − n2)+ = 0.
We combine one sum-rate inequality (42) with (47) and
one with (51). Moreover, we plug (45) and (46) into the
corresponding bound, which yields
n(2R1 +R2 − 6) ≤ H(Y n1,D,c) + I(Xn2,D;Y n1,D,p|Y n1,D,c)
+H(Y n1,D,p|Y2,D, Y1,D,c)
and
n(R1 + 2R2 − 7) ≤ H(Y n1,D,c) + I(Xn1,D;Y n1,D,p|Y n1,D,c)
+H(Y n1,D,p|Y2,D, Y1,D,c) + nn∆.
A summation of these results gives
3n(R1 +R2)− n8
≤ 2H(Y n1,D,c) + I(Xn1,D;Y n1,D,p|Y n1,D,c)
+ I(Xn2,D;Y
n
1,D,p|Y n1,D,c) + nn∆
+ 2H(Y n1,D,p|Y2,D, Y1,D,c)
= 2H(Y n1,D,c) +H(Y
n
1,D,p|Y n1,D,c) + nn∆
+ 2H(Y n1,D,p|Y2,D, Y1,D,c),
where we used (46). Now, because H(Y n1,D,p|Y2,D, Y1,D,c) ≤
nnp, H(Y n1,D,p|Y n1,D,c) ≤ nnp and H(Y n1,D,c) ≤ nc, we have
3n(R1 +R2)− n8 ≤ 2nnc + 3nnp + nn∆.
Dividing by 3n and letting n→∞ shows the result.
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2) Case nE > n2: First, we assume that nE ≥ n1, and
include a short proof for n1 > nE ≥ n2 at the end of this
subsection. For this case, the private part Y n1,D,p is zero, due
to the definition of the private part and nE > n2. It follows
that (42) is
n(R1 +R2) ≤ H(Y n1,D|Y n2,D). (53)
Moreover, we have that
H(bh2X2,Dc) = H((bh2X2,Dc)[:nE ]) ≤ H(bhEX2,Dc),
which is why we need to bound (53) by H(bh1X1,Dc) and
H(bh2X2,Dc). We therefore modify (51) to fit our case in the
following way
H(Y n1,D|Y2,D)
= H(Y n1,D, Y2,D)−H(Y2,D)
≤ H(Y2,D, bh1X1,Dc, bh2X2,Dc)−H(Y2,D)
= H(bh1X1,Dc, bh2X2,Dc)−H(Y2,D)
+H(Y2,D|bh1X1,Dc, bh2X2,Dc)
= H(bh1X1,Dc, bh2X2,Dc) +H(Y n2,D,c|bh1X1,Dc, bh2X2,Dc)
+H(Y n2,D,p|bh1X1,Dc, bh2X2,Dc, Y n2,D,c)
−H(Y n2,D,c)−H(Y n2,D,p|Y n2,D,c)
≤ H(bh1X1,Dc, bh2X2,Dc)
+H(Y n2,D,c|bh1X1,Dc, bh2X2,Dc)−H(Y n2,D,c),
where Y n2,D,c = (Y
n
2,D)[:n1] and Y
n
2,D,p = (Y
n
2,D)[n1+1:]. Now,
we can show that
H(Y n1,D|Y2,D)
≤ H(bh1X1,Dc, bh2X2,Dc)
+H(Y n2,D,c|bh1X1,Dc, bh2X2,Dc)−H(Y n2,D,c),
= H(bh1X1,Dc, bh2X2,Dc)
−H(Y n2,D,c) +H((bhEX2,Dc)[:n1]|bh2X2,Dc)
≤ H(bh1X1,Dc) +H(bh2X2,Dc)−H(Y n2,D,c|X2,D)
+H((bhEX2,Dc)[:n1]|bh2X2,Dc)
= H(bh2X2,Dc) +H((bhEX2,Dc)[:n1]|bh2X2,Dc)
≤ H(bh2X2,Dc) + nn∆, (54)
where the last inequality follows because we have that
H((bhEX2,Dc)[:n1]|bh2X2,Dc)
= H((bhEX2,Dc)[n2+1:n1]|bh2X2,Dc), (55)
due to lemma 2 and the chain-rule. Bounding H(Y n1,D|Y2,D)
by H(bh1X1,Dc) requires more work. We have a redundancy
in the negative entropy terms, with which we can cancel the
H((bhEX2,Dc)[:n1]|bh2X2,Dc) term in the following way
H(Y n1,D|Y2,D)
≤ H(bh1X1,Dc, bh2X2,Dc)
+H(Y n2,D,c|bh1X1,Dc, bh2X2,Dc)−H(Y n2,D,c),
≤ H(bh1X1,Dc) +H(bh2X2,Dc)−H((Y n2,D,c)[:n2]|X1,D)
+H((bhEX2,Dc)[:n1]|bh2X2,Dc)
−H((Y n2,D,c)[n2+1:]|X1,D, (Y n2,D,c)[:n2])
= H(bh1X1,Dc)−H((Y n2,D,c)[n2+1:]|X1,D, (Y n2,D,c)[:n2])
+H((bhEX2,Dc)[:n1]|bh2X2,Dc)
≤ H(bh1X1,Dc) +H((bhEX2,Dc)[:n1]|bh2X2,Dc)
−H((Y n2,D,c)[n2+1:]|X1,D, (Y n2,D,c)[:n2], bh2X2,Dc)
= H(bh1X1,Dc)−H((Y n2,D,c)[n2+1:]|X1,D, bh2X2,Dc)
+H((bhEX2,Dc)[:n1]|bh2X2,Dc)
= H(bh1X1,Dc)−H((bhEX2,Dc)[n2+1:n1]|bh2X2,Dc)
+H((bhEX2,Dc)[:n1]|bh2X2,Dc)
= H(bh1X1,Dc), (56)
where the last step follows due to equation (55). Now we can
bound one (53) with (54) and one with (56). Moreover, we
use (45) and (46) on the result. Note that due to our regime,
(45) becomes
H(bh2X2,Dc) ≤ H(Y n1,D)− n(R1 + 3), (57)
while (46) becomes
H(bh1X1,Dc) ≤ H(Y n1,D)− n(R2 + 4). (58)
Putting everything together results in
3n(R1 +R2)− n8 ≤ 2nnc + nn∆.
Dividing by 3n and letting n→∞ shows the result. We need
to modify a bound on H(Y n1,D|Y2,D), if the signal strength nE
lies in between n1 and n2. In (54), we see that
H(bh1X1,Dc)−H(Y n2,D,c|X2,D) ≤ n(n1 − nE)+. (59)
Moreover, we have that
H((bhEX2,Dc)[:n1]|bh2X2,Dc) ≤ n(nE − n2)+. (60)
Both changes cancel and we get the same result as (54). The
result follows on the same lines as in the previous derivation.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have shown an achievable scheme for both the Gaussian
multiple-access wiretap channel and the Gaussian wiretap
channel with a helper. We used the linear deterministic ap-
proximation of both models to gain insights into the structure
and devised novel achievable schemes based on orthogonal
bit-level alignment to achieve secrecy. These techniques can
be summarized as signal-scale alignment methods, where we
used jamming alignment at the eavesdropper in the signal-
scale, while minimizing the negative effect at the legitimate
receiver. Both results were then transferred to the Gaussian
model, by utilizing layered lattice coding. Moreover, we
developed converse proofs for both models, which achieve a
constant-gap bound for certain signal power regimes. Those
converse techniques were developed for the LD model and
then transferred to a truncated deterministic model, which
in turn is within a constant-gap of the integer-input integer-
output model. The integer-input integer-output model yields
converse proofs for the Gaussian models, by invoking a result
of [28]. Since our results hold for asymmetrical channel gains
and are dependent on those ratios, they give insights into the
secure g.d.o.f. and converge to the known s.d.o.f. results for
the channel gain ratio approaching one.
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